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ABSTRACT

Cluster munitions have been a significant weapon in the
world's arsenals for the last half-century, but their use has
drawn sharp criticism for its impact on civilian populations.
The weapons function by releasing dozens of small "bomblets"
over a wide area. For years the debate over these weapons was
focused on whether they violated the norms of international
humanitarian law, but the 2008 Convention on Cluster
Munitions has altered the discussion, banning the weapons
outright. However, the major states that use the weapons,
including the United States, have not joined the Convention,
and the use of cluster munitions continues. This Note focuses in
particular on the American approach to the weapons. It
examines the legal status of the weapons and the degree to
which U.S. policy has addressed some of the problems
associated with them. Finally, it argues that if the United
States insists on using cluster munitions, it must create a
stricter policy to ensure that its use of the weapons is actually
legal.

Therefore, order all your livestock and whatever else you have in the
open fields to be brought to a place of safety. Whatever man or beast
remains in the fields and is not brought to shelter shall die when the
hail comes upon them.
-Exodus 9:19
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INTRODUCTION

The
recent Convention on Cluster
Munitions (CCM,
Convention)' is the latest attempt by the international community to
Previous efforts focused on
humanize the conduct of war.
as
landmines. 2 A body of law,
such
prohibitions of other weapons,
international humanitarian law (IHL), has also arisen in response to
''war crimes," seeking to punish those who use methods that
unnecessarily increase the suffering caused by warfare.3 Weapons
that violate this body of law may become banned by treaty. 4 Prior to
the drafting of the Convention, there was debate about the legality of
Cluster munitions are common
cluster munitions under IHL.5
ordnance in many of the world's militarieS6 since the rise in use
International courts have convicted
during the Vietnam War.7
commanders for war crimes due to their use of cluster munitions
8
without ruling on whether the weapons were per se illegal. Even
9
after the advent of the Convention, the debate continues. Most of
the world's major users and stockpilers of cluster munitions have not
signed the CCM,10 and the United States recently made extensive use
of the weapons in Iraq and Afghanistan."
Cluster munitions are capable of causing significant and
widespread harm to innocent civilians.' 2 Whether this danger is
inherent in the weapons themselves or a result of their misuse is

Convention on Cluster Munitions, opened for signature Dec. 3, 2008, 48
1.
I.L.M. 357, http://treaties.un.org/doclPublication/CTC/26-6.pdf [hereinafter CCM].
2.
See generally Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, opened for
signature Dec. 3, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211 [hereinafter Land Mine Treaty].
See Bonnie Docherty, The Time is Now: A HistoricalArgument for a Cluster
3.
Munitions Convention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 53 (2007) (explaining the origins of
international humanitarian law).
Id. at 53-54.
4.
See infra Parts IV.A, V.A.
5.
See infra text accompanying notes 57-60.
6.
See infra text accompanying notes 57-60.
7.
See generally Prosecutor v. Milan Marti6, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment
8.
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007) (finding Martid guilty of
war crimes for ordering a cluster munition attack on a city); Partial Award-Central
Front-Ethiopia's Claim 2 (Eri. v. Eth.), 43 I.L.M. 1275 (Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Comm'n 2004) (convicting for a cluster bomb attack that struck a school).
See, e.g., Michael 0. Lacey, Cluster Munitions: Wonder Weapons or
9.
HumanitarianHorror?, 2009 ARMY LAW. 28, 29-30 (2009) (arguing for the legality of
cluster munitions).
See infra text accompanying note 134.
10.
Karl C. Ching, Note, The Use of Cluster Munitions in the War on Terrorism,
11.
31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 127, 139-40 (2007).
See infra Part III.A.
12.
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often a central point of contention in the debate over their legality.' 3
Regardless, both sides agree that unintended casualties are a serious
problem, and even the U.S. Department of Defense adopted a policy
designed to reduce the potential for collateral damage.14 The CCM
offers a simple solution to the problem-ban the weapons outright.
However, without the assent of the world's major users of cluster
munitions, the proposal's efficacy in eradicating problems associated
with the ordnance is limited.' 5 Efforts to prosecute users for war
crimes, whether based on a theory of illegal use or per se illegality,
are likewise dependent on the agreement of potential defendants to
abide by a treaty.16
Nations that use cluster munitions are reluctant to join treaties
that ban the weapons or subject them to war crimes prosecution. As
a result, the processes by which these states choose to use the
weapons directly impact the credibility of their claims that cluster
munitions are legal. Although the United States adopted a policy
that will likely reduce the incidence of postwar cluster munition
casualties in the future,' 7 it has not adequately addressed the issues
of when and how cluster munitions are properly used. Sweeping
arguments that commanders must engage in proper balancing of
costs and benefits before employing cluster munitions are inadequate,
providing little actual guidance. Instead, the United States should
adopt a stricter policy on the use of cluster munitions, requiring
several absolute conditions to be met before cost-benefit balancing
can even begin. Rather than maintaining that cluster munitions may
be legal, the United States must ensure that every use of the weapons
by American forces is in fact legal. Such an approach would not only
decrease the collateral damage associated with American cluster
munition use, but could also have the salutary effect of influencing
the behavior of other user states by setting a high standard for proper
use. Sloppy, ad hoc decision-making processes will become even
harder to justify when compared to a thorough and regimented
approach.

See infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
13.
Memorandum from Robert M. Gates, U.S. Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'ys of the
14.
Military Dep'ts; the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Under Sec'y of Def. for
Acquisition, Tech. and Logistics; the Under Sec'y of Def. for Policy; the Commanders of
the Combat Commands; and the Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def. 1 (June 19, 2008),
http://www.defenselink.millnews/d200807O9cmpolicy.pdf [hereinafter Defense Policy
Memorandum].
15.
See infra Part IV.D.
Id.
16.
See Defense Policy Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2 (establishing a policy
17.
to reduce the number of cluster munition duds left on the battlefield).
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BACKGROUND

A. Defining Cluster Munitions: How They Work
and the Function They Serve
Cluster munitions target an area rather than a single point.
This type of ordnance, which can be delivered by several means,1 8
consists of a container that releases submunitions, or bomblets, while
in flight.' 9 The result is a shower of small explosives that cover a
large area. 20 The recent Convention on Cluster Munitions, which
bans the weapons, defines a cluster munition as "a conventional
munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive
submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes
those explosive submunitions." 21 Although the Convention sets 20
kilograms as the maximum weight for submunitions, in practice
submunitions are much smaller. Usually the size of tennis balls or
soda cans and weighing only a few kilograms, submunitions are more
akin to hand grenades than other bombs. 22 Although small in size,
these bomblets are powerful 23 and versatile, often delivering
antipersonnel fragmentation, armor-piercing shape charges, and
incendiary effects in the same compact package.24 The multiple
effects of the submunitions are designed to achieve the intended uses
of cluster munitions; they are deployed against troop formations,
vehicle convoys, airfields, antiaircraft weapons, and other targets
that combine personnel and light armor.2 5

18.
Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate
Weapons Under InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 22 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 85, 89 (2000).
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
21.
CCM, supra note 1, art. 2(2). The CCM also lists three exceptions to the
general definition, excluding antiaircraft weapons and countermeasures, munitions
with electrical or electronic effects, and ordnances that carry fewer than ten
submunitions and have specific safeguards that mitigate the negative externalities
that led to the treaty's creation. Id.
Thomas Michael McDonnell, Cluster Bombs Over Kosovo: A Violation of
22.
InternationalLaw?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 45 (2002); Wiebe, supra note 18, at 89; see also
FEDERATION

OF

AMERICAN

SCIENTISTS,

DUMB

BOMBS

(1999),

available

at

of
photographs
(depicting
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-lo/sys/dumb/cluster.htm
submunitions alongside rulers to demonstrate their small size).
23.
Wiebe, supra note 18, at 114 (describing bomblets as being even more
powerful than landmines).
24.
Id. at 90. Shape charges are designed to penetrate armor by focusing the
force of the explosion in a specific direction. Incendiary charges include hot-burning
metals that ignite objects upon contact. Id.
25.
Defense Policy Memorandum, supra note 14, at 1.
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26
Today's cluster munitions can be delivered by aerial bombs,
29
28
27
The
and cruise missiles.
artillery rockets,
artillery shells,
primary weapon, or dispenser, carries scores, even hundreds, of
submunitions.3 0 At a predetermined point prior to reaching the
target, the dispenser releases the submunitions, dispersing them in
the air and blanketing the target area. 3 ' As the bomblets fall to the
earth, their explosive mechanisms become armed, usually by rapid
spinning 32 or the deployment of small parachutes.3 3 Once armed, the
submunitions explode either shortly before landing, on contact, or
shortly after landing. 34 The submunition casings are often scored to
create a fragmentation pattern of uniformly shaped projectiles, rather
than irregular shards of metal.3 5 These fragments make bomblets
powerful antipersonnel weapons, capable of killing or seriously
wounding anyone standing within 150 meters of the explosion.3 6
Each bomblet essentially acts similar to a powerful variant of the
hand grenade. Many submunitions are designed to serve multiple
purposes, and thus contain directional charges designed to penetrate
armor37 or an incendiary element, such as zirconium, which burns at
a very high temperature.3 8 The anti-armor bomblets usually must
land in a particular manner to detonate, in order to ensure that the
charge fires in the right direction. Thus, they are usually stabilized
9
by parachutes in their descent.3
The size of the "footprint," the area covered by the bomblets,
varies based on several factors, including release altitude, wind, and
number of submunitions. 40 Roughly speaking, however, most cluster
munitions are designed to have a footprint at least the size of a
football field, and often larger.41 When multiple cluster munitions
are deployed in tandem, the area multiplies. For example, the U.S.
Army's Multiple Launch Rocket System can fire twelve rockets
42
together, creating a footprint roughly sixty football fields in size. A

Wiebe, supra note 18, at 89.
26.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id. at 128.
McDonnell, supranote 22, at 44.
30.
31.
Id.
Wiebe, supra note 18, at 90.
32.
McDonnell, supra note 22, at 45.
33.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
Wiebe, supra note 18, at 89.
36.
McDonnell, supranote 22, at 45.
37.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
Wiebe, supra note 18, at 109-10.
40.
McDonnell, supra note 22, at 47 (stating that a typical CBU-87B cluster
41.
bomb has a footprint of over five football fields).
Wiebe, supra note 18, at 110.
42.
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fully loaded B-52 bomber, delivering forty cluster bombs in a "carpet
bombing" attack, can cover over 27,000 football fields.4 3 Multiple
cluster munitions can also be targeted at the same point, increasing
the saturation of submunitions within the footprint.44 Although some
cluster munitions have precision guidance systems, 4 5 the vast
majority are not "smart bombs" and are unguided once fired or
released. The same factors that affect the size of the footprint affect
the accuracy of the weapon as a whole-the location of the footprint
can vary by distances as large as the footprint itself.46
The initial appeal of cluster munitions during the Vietnam War
was this ability to blanket large areas with just a few bombs.
American aircrews put them to use in attacking enemy antiaircraft
positions. 4 7 Because today's sophisticated guidance systems were not
yet in existence, hitting a relatively small target with a unitary bomb
was a difficult task that often required an aircraft to fly low, making
it more susceptible to antiaircraft fire. 48 Cluster munitions offered a
solution to this problem. By covering a wide area with small but
powerful bomblets, they increased the margin of error when aiming
at small targets and allowed attacking planes to maintain safer
altitudes. 49 The same properties that made the bombs useful in
attacking small singular targets offered advantages in attacking
troop columns and vehicles-not only was accuracy less of a concern
than with a unitary bomb, but the ability to engage multiple targets
at once increased the weapons' utility.50 Responding to political
pressure, American commanders also began using cluster munitions
in situations where they had previously been using napalm.5 1

B. History: The Development of Cluster Munitions and
Their Current Use
Ordnance designed to target multiple enemies with a single
discharge can be traced back to the grape and canister shot used by

Id. at 93.
43.
44.
Id. at 110 (comparing "salvo" fired cluster bombs to Godzilla stomping a
single location).
45.
Id. at 127-28.
See, e.g., id. at 123 (describing the possible landing area of one type of
46.
cluster munition as having a 600 meter radius, comparing a bomb's footprint of 150 by
200 meters).
47.
Thomas J. Herthel, On the Chopping Block: Cluster Munitions and the Law
of War, 51 A.F. L. REV. 229, 236-37 (2001).
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Defense Policy Memo, supra note 14, at 1.
50.
McDonnell, supra note 22, at 41.
51.
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artillery crews before the invention of explosive shells, 52 but cluster
munitions as they exist today were developed in the twentieth
century.5 3 German and Soviet forces used cluster munitions on the
Eastern Front in World War II,54 and the Germans also used them in
the bombardment of Great Britain.5 5 However, the weapons saw
their first widespread use in the Vietnam War. 56 Since Vietnam,
cluster munitions have been used by over twenty states,57 as well as
some non-state actors.58 Cluster munitions were used in the first
Gulf War, the Balkans, Chechnya, the conflict between Ethiopia and
Eritrea, Afghanistan, Iraq, and in Israel's conflict with Hezbollah
forces in Lebanon, as well as in over a dozen other instances.5 9
Thirty-four states manufacture or have manufactured cluster
munitions, including China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. 60
The United States remains a leader in the use and development
of cluster munitions. American forces deployed roughly 800,000
cluster bombs during the Vietnam War and used them extensively in
the first Gulf War, as well as in the current wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq. 61 Currently, all four branches of the American military employ
cluster munitions. 62 American-made cluster munitions have become
part of foreign arsenals, most notably that of Israel, which used over
four million cluster submunitions in its 2006 conflict with Hezbollah
Although Israel manufactures its own cluster
in Lebanon. 63
munitions, those used in 2006 were largely American made. 64 NATO
forces, primarily American and British, used cluster munitions
65
extensively in the 1999 aerial bombing campaign over Kosovo.

52.

See WARREN RIPLEY, ARTILLERY AND AMMUNITION OF THE CIVIL WAR 264-

68 (A & W Promotional 1970) (describing the grape and canister shot used in the
American Civil War).
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TIMELINE OF CLUSTER MUNITION USE (2008),
53.
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related-material/Timeline-Cluster_-Use_05.08.pdf.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.

57.
58.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53.
Id.

59.
60.

Id.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLUSTER MUNITIONS INFORMATION CHART (2009),

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/relatedmaterial/2009.11.18.%20HRW%20Cluste
r%20Chart,%20Updated.pdf.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53.
61.
See Docherty, supra note 3, at 66-67 (quoting a Marine officer who chose
62.
not to use cluster munitions in Iraq); Lacey, supra note 9, at 28 (comparing the relative
size of Army and Air Force arsenals); Wiebe, supra note 18, at 128 (discussing the
Navy's limited use of cluster munitions in Kosovo).
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53.
63.
THOMAS NASH, FORESEEABLE HARM: THE USE AND IMPACT OF CLUSTER
64.
MUNITIONS IN LEBANON 8 (Richard Moyes ed., Landmine Action 2006).
65.
Wiebe, supra note 18, at 127.
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Considering that the weapons were developed during the Cold War, it
is perhaps not surprising that the Russian military also stockpiles
and uses cluster munitions, recently employing them in Chechnya
and Georgia. 66
The use of cluster munitions is not limited to industrial powers
and the world's largest militaries. These weapons are also used by
smaller states and non-state actors. Georgian forces fired rockets
containing cluster munitions at Russian troops in the 2008 conflict. 67
In their 2006 war, both Israel and Hezbollah used cluster
munitions. 68 Smaller states have not limited their use of cluster
munitions to conflicts with larger states, but have also used them
against each other. Ethiopia and Eritrea both used cluster munitions
against each other in their 1998 war. 69 In 1995, the now-defunct
Republic of Serbian Krajina fired rockets carrying cluster munitions
into Croatia. 70 These conflicts are just a few examples of the use of
cluster munitions over the last fifteen years.7 ' Although cluster
munitions are probably most closely associated with the United
States and other world powers, their use and impact are global.

III. THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS
Despite their popularity among the world's militaries, 72 cluster
munitions have drawn criticism for their impact on civilian
populations. Some scholars have argued that the weapons violate
traditional norms of international humanitarian law (IHL).7 3
Individuals and states have been successfully prosecuted in
international tribunals for specific uses of cluster munitions that
were deemed to violate IHL. 74 However, these tribunals have not yet
75
held the use of cluster munitions to be a per se violation of IHL.

66.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53.
67.
Michael Schwirtz, Georgia FiredMore Cluster Bombs than Thought, Killing
Civilians,Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A18.
68.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53.
69.
Id.
70.
Virgil Wiebe, For Whom the Little Bells Toll: Recent Judgments by
International Tribunals on the Legality of Cluster Munitions, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 895,
916-17 (2008).
71.
HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53.
72.
See supratext accompanying notes 57-60.
73.
See, e.g., Wiebe, supra note 18, at 112 (discussing the indiscriminate nature
of cluster munitions).
See generally Wiebe, supra note 70 (analyzing convictions of a political
74.
leader in the former Yugoslavia and the Eritrean state for the use of cluster
munitions).
McDonnell, supra note 22, at 108-18.
75.
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Additionally, cluster munitions are not banned under the Convention
on Conventional Weapons (CCW). 76
After the most recent revision of the CCW failed to ban cluster
munitions, a group of states and nongovernmental organizations
drafted a new treaty specifically aimed at banning cluster
munitions.7 The result was the Convention on Cluster Munitions.7 8
As explained below, the impetus behind this movement was the great
harm suffered by civilian populations due to the use of these
weapons.

A. Wide Footprintsand High Dud Rates: Why ClusterMunitions
Are ParticularlyHarmful to Civilians
Opponents argue that the use of cluster munitions violates the
IHL principles of proportionality and distinction.79 These arguments
stem from two characteristics of cluster munitions: their wide
Cluster munitions, like other
footprints and high dud rates.
unguided ordnance, inevitably have the potential to miss their
targets.80 The wide footprints created by the submunition cluster
patterns exacerbate the ordinary risk of missing a target. The area
likely to be affected by an off-target cluster bomb is greater than that
of an off-target unitary bomb because rather than striking one
location, the submunitions blanket surrounding areas.8 ' However,
the dangers that cluster munitions pose to civilians are not limited to
occasions when the bombs "miss." The very nature of the weapons
makes them likely to affect people and structures other than the
objective even if they are directly on target; persons standing one
hundred meters away can still be at risk of death or wounding by the
submunitions.8 2 Thus, even perfectly executed strikes aimed at
military objectives can result in significant collateral damage if the
target is located in close proximity to civilians.

76.
Wiebe, supra note 18, at 156; see generally Protocol on Explosive Remnants
of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol V), Nov. 27, 2003, U.N. Doc. CCWIMSP/2003/2
[hereinafter CCW]. For the purposes of this Note, CCW means Protocol V, dealing with
explosive remnants of war (ERW), and not the Convention as a whole.
77.
Jessica Corsi, Note, Towards Peace Through Legal Innovation: The Process
and the Promise of the 2008 Cluster Munitions Convention, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 145,
149 (2009).
78.
Id. at 149-50.
79.
Wiebe, supra note 18, at 112. For a discussion of the principles of
proportionality and distinction, see infra Part IV.A.
80.
Id. at 123.
81.
See id. at 140-42 (describing effects of an off-target cluster bomb in Nis,
Serbia during NATO bombing of Kosovo).
82.
Id. at 89.
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Perhaps even more alarming than cluster munitions' wide
footprints is the issue of their high dud rates. Generally, some
percentage of all ordnance are faulty,83 leaving unexploded ordnance
(UXO) on the battlefield. Official estimates, including those supplied
by manufacturers, state that the failure rate of submunitions is about
5 percent, meaning these weapons are just as likely to be duds as any
other bombs. 84 However, estimates of dud rates in practice are much
higher, ranging from 1085 to as high as 30 percent. 86 Battlefield
conditions differ significantly from manufacturer testing conditions,
accounting for these increased failure rates.8 7 The stresses of flying,
particularly takeoffs, landings, and combat maneuvering, likely
increase dud rates.88 Moreover, many of the cluster munitions used
in combat were stockpiled for years, even decades, increasing the
chances of faultiness.8 9 Some submunitions, such as the armorpiercing varieties that must land properly to explode, may fail to
explode if they land on an angle.9 0 Terrain can also affect dud rates.
Soft surfaces like desert sand and jungle marshes may not provide
the resistance needed to detonate the bombs.9 ' Submunitions with
parachutes can become entangled in tree limbs. 92 As a result of high
dud rates, thousands of unexploded bomblets disperse on
battlefields. 93
Unexploded submunitions are even more harmful than other
unexploded bombs. For example, an unexploded 500-pound bomb is
larger in size and easily identifiable as hazardous. The small size of
the bomblets creates two significant problems. First, they are
difficult to detect and can lay hidden in mud, water, and even on
rooftops. 94 They can remain volatile for years after their arming;
even today, submunitions released during the Vietnam War kill and
wound farmers in Southeast Asia.95 The widespread distribution of
easily hidden bomblets makes clearance efforts difficult, and can

83.
Herthel, supra note 47, at 265-66.
84.
Wiebe, supranote 18, at 118.
Id.
85.
Docherty, supra note 3, at 63.
86.
Wiebe, supranote 18, at 118.
87.
Id.
88.
NASH, supra note 64, at 10 (showing photograph of failed cluster bomb from
89.
2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, manufactured in the 1970s).
90.
Wiebe, supranote 18, at 118.
91.
McDonnell, supra note 22, at 51; Wiebe, supra note 18, at 118. This is of
special concern considering the large-scale use of cluster munitions in places like Iraq
and Southeast Asia.
Wiebe, supra note 18, at 124.
92.
See, e.g., John Borneman, The State of War Crimes Following the Israeli93.
Hezbollah War, 25 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 273, 275 (2007) (estimating over
100,000 unexploded bomblets leftover from Israel-Hezbollah war).
Docherty, supranote 3, at 63; Wiebe, supra note 18, at 118.
94.
95.
Wiebe, supra note 18, at 91-92.
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render areas uninhabitable for years after the guns have gone
silent.9 6 In this regard, cluster munition duds are very much like
active landmines.97 In fact, armed unexploded bomblets can be worse
than mines because they are often less stable.9 8 Second, even visible
bomblets are problematic.
The small size and bright colors of
bomblets attract children, who think they are toys.99 The bright color
schemes are used to make the submunitions easier to spot for
clearance crews searching for duds, but they have the perverse effect
of catching children's eyes.10 0 Additionally, their appearance is
similar to humanitarian aid packages, exacerbating the problem.' 0 '
Even if cluster munitions had the same dud rates as other types of
ordnance, they are more dangerous to civilians than other types of
UXO because of the size and appearance of the bomblets.

B. The Push to Ban Cluster Munitions via Treaty
Although some scholars argue that cluster munition use violates
principles of IHL, at least when in proximity to populated areas,10 2
and some individual users have been found liable of war crimes in
international courts, 103 the international community never banned
them outright in arms treaties until the CCM. The Convention on
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Land Mine Treaty),
drafted in 1997, defines mines narrowly to exclude cluster
munitions,104 even though cluster munitions duds create many of the

96.
NASH, supra note 64, at 16.
97.
In fact, they can be more dangerous than land mines. McDonnell, supra
note 22, at 56-57. But see Herthel, supra note 47, at 252-55 (distinguishing
submunitions from mines).
98.
McDonnell, supra note 22, at 55.
99.
Docherty, supra note 3, at 63.
100.
Lacey, supranote 9, at 30.
101.
Ching, supra note 11, at 140 (describing Afghan civilians avoiding aid
packages because of difficulty differentiating them from bomblets).
102.
See, e.g., McDonell, supra note 22, at 71 (arguing that "[1]ogically, [cluster
munitions] should be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering, particularly when
directed solely against troops," but acknowledging that IHL does not take that
position); Wiebe, supra note 18, at 112-13 (arguing that "[tihe combination of
questionable targeting ability, large footprints, and multipurpose use for submunitions
makes compliance with international humanitarian law difficult, if not impossible,
when using cluster munitions in populated areas").
See Prosecutor v. Martid, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib.
103.
for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007); Partial Award-Central Front-Ethiopia's
Claim 2 (Eri. v. Eth.), 43 I.L.M. 1275 (Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm'n 2004) (holding
Eritrea liable for civilian deaths caused by cluster bombs).
104.
The treaty defines an anti-personnel mine as one "designed to be exploded
by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or
kill one or more persons." Land Mine Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
The inclusion of the word "designed" excludes bomblets, which are designed to explode
upon falling to the earth.
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same dangers as landmines. 0 5
When a protocol dealing with
explosive remnants of war (ERW) was added to the CCW in 2003,
cluster munitions were not given any individual treatment.106
Recognizing the need to address cluster munitions specifically,
several states and nongovernmental organizations, including those
that were instrumental in creating the Land Mine Treaty, 0 7 began
working on a treaty. The effort, led by Norway and known as the
Oslo Process, resulted in the CCM, signed by over one hundred states
at the end of 2008.108 The Convention entered into effect in February
2010,109 six months after its ratification by thirty states,o10 and the
CCM became binding on state parties in August 2010."'

C. Key Provisionsof the CCM
Article 1 of the CCM bans the use, development, production,
acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of cluster
munitions.112 The Convention differentiates cluster munitions from
mines," 3 specifically defining this weapon as "a conventional
munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive
submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes
those explosive submunitions."11 4 Article 3 requires state parties to
destroy their stockpiles of cluster munitions "as soon as possible but
not later than eight years after the entry into force of [the]
Convention." 5 The Convention does, however, allow parties to
maintain the minimal amount of cluster munitions necessary to train
personnel in detecting, clearing, and destroying submunition UXO.x" 6
Article 4 requires state parties to clear and destroy cluster munition
remnants under their control within ten years." 7 The state must
mark and fence off contaminated areas 18 and educate civilians on

See supra Part III.A (arguing that cluster munitions are particularly
105.
dangerous to civilians).
106.
See supra note 76.
107.
Corsi, supra note 77, at 147-50.
COLLECTION,
TREATY
Cluster Munitions, UN
108.
Convention on
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=XXVI-6&chapter
=26&lang-en (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
109.
Convention on Cluster Munitions, supranote 108.
110.
CCM, supra note 1, art. 17(1).
111.
Id.
112.
CCM, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
113.
Id. art. 1(3).
Id. art. 2(2); see also supra note 21 (listing exceptions).
114.
115.
CCM, supra note 1, art. 3(2).
Id. art. 3(6). The treaty also allows the transfer of small amounts of cluster
116.
munitions for the same purpose.
117.
Id. art. 4(1)(a).
118.
Id. art. 4(2)(c).
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the risks of cluster munition remnants.11 9 Article 4 also encourages
states that have used cluster munitions in areas controlled by other
state parties to share information that will aid the latter states in
clearing their land.1 20 In addition, under Article 6 state parties are
generally required to assist others and to exchange equipment and
scientific information.121 Article 7 requires, as part of its compliance
with the CCM, that each state party report to the United Nations the
number of cluster munitions in its stockpile, as well as their technical
characteristics.1 22 Article 5 requires state parties to provide "medical
care, rehabilitation and psychological support" for the victims of
cluster munitions,123 defined to include all persons affected by the
weapons, as well as their families.124 These and other provisions of
the CCM parallel the major provisions of the Land Mine Treaty.125
The CCM has a unique provision that was instrumental in
convincing some states to sign. 26 Article 21 of the CCM governs
relations with states that are not signatories to the Convention.127
First, state parties are required to encourage non-signatory states to
ratify the Convention and to inform those states of the obligations of
state parties under the Convention.128 Second, the Article allows, "in
accordance with international law, State Parties, their military
personnel or nationals, [to] engage in military cooperation and
operations with States not party to [the] Convention that might
engage in activities prohibited to a State Party."' 29 This provision,
proposed by Germany,13 0 allowed NATO member states, including
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, to sign the Convention
without hampering their ability to operate alongside American
forces.11 Along with preserving the ability of state parties to operate
jointly with states using cluster munitions, Article 21 serves an
aspirational purpose; the hope is that state parties allied with non-

119.
Id. art. 4(2)(d).
120.
Id. art. 4(4).
121.
Id. art. 6.
122.
Id. art. 7.
123.
Id. art. 5(1).
124.
Id. art. 2(1).
125.
See generally CCM, supra note 1; Land Mine Treaty, supranote 2.
126.
John F. Burns, Britain Joins a Draft Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2008, at A13.
127.
CCM, supranote 1, art. 21.
128.
Id. art. 21(1)-(2).
129.
Id. art. 21(3).
Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster
130.
Munitions, Proposal by Germany, Supported by Denmark, France, Italy, Slovakia,
Spain, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom for the Amendment of Article 1,
May 30, 2008, http://www.elustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/CCM13_001.pdf.
131.
Article 21 is clear in that it does not allow those state parties to use or
request the use of cluster munitions in such joint operations. CCM, supra note 1, art.
21(4).
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signatory states will encourage these states to renounce their use of
cluster munitions. 132

IV. CLUSTER MUNITIONS AFTER THE CCM

At present, 108 states have signed the CCM, although only fifty
Roughly 50 percent of
have ratified it and become parties.' 3 3
countries have not signed the CCM. Among these non-signatories are
numerous states that have produced or stockpiled cluster munitions,
including China, India, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan,
Russia, and the United States.13 4 Although some of these states have
independently taken measures limiting the use, production, or
transfer of the weapons, 3 5 none of them are bound by the CCM
provisions. This situation presents a question as to how cluster
munition use by states not party to the Convention should be
analyzed under international law. The rules of international law that
governed cluster munition usage before the CCM still apply to these
states, and must be interpreted in light of the Convention.
A. InternationalHumanitarianLaw: Additional Protocol I
to the Geneva Conventions
The law of war, also termed international humanitarian law,
governs the manner in which states and non-state actors wage
IHL has traditionally been rooted in two sources:
war.136
international agreements, such as treaties and conventions, and
Customary IHL is not entirely
customary international law.' 3 7
independent of the system of treaties-over a long period of time, the
rules set out in a treaty may become so widely followed as to become
law by custom, and thus become binding on states not party to the
treaties.13 8 This rule of customary IHL prevents non-state actors and
states not signatories to certain treaties from violating the norms of
warfare with impunity.' 39 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide
the basis of IHL in the modern context.140 In the years since the
original Geneva Conventions, the international community has added
additional protocols. The first of these protocols, adopted in 1977

See Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 108 (declarations of the
132.
Holy See).

133.

Id.

134.
135.
136.

HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 60.
Id.
Ching, supra note 11, at 134.

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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(Protocol I), addresses the basic principles of IHL, which apply to the
use of cluster munitions. 14 1 Although the United States signed
Protocol 1,142 it was never presented to the Senate for ratification. 143
Thus, the United States is not actually a party to Protocol I, although
its major provisions on IHL have become generally accepted
worldwide and are understood to be customary IHL.144
Protocol I defines two principles of IHL that are especially
relevant to cluster munitions: distinction and proportionality.145
Importantly, Protocol I establishes ground rules for choosing
weapons.146 Article 35 states the basic rule that the right "to choose
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited," specifically banning
weapons which "cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering"
and those "which are intended, or may be expected, to cause
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment."147 Without even reading any further, one can see
where cluster munitions could be problematic under Protocol I; as
explained supra,14 8 they often harm civilians and leave areas
uninhabitable after the end of combat. Additional articles restrict the
use of cluster munitions to an even greater extent.
The principle of distinction prohibits attacks on civilians. Article
48 requires that combatants "at all times distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives."149 Protocol I also includes a provision
stating that the presence of non-civilians within the civilian
population does not change the status of the population to a noncivilian one.15 0 Article 51 prohibits indiscriminate attacks, defined
as, inter alia, "[t]hose which employ a method or means of combat
military
a
specific
at
directed
be
cannot
which
objective . . . and .

.

. are of a nature to strike military objectives and

civilians or civilian objects without distinction."15 ' Critics of cluster
munitions use these articles to establish that cluster munitions, in

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
141.
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
Protocol I, UN TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/show
142.
Details.aspx?objid=08000002800f3586 (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
David Glazier, Missing in Action? United States Leadership in the Law of
143.
War, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1335, 1338-39 (2009).
McDonnell, supra note 22, at 103-08.
144.
See discussion infra this section.
145.
Protocol I, supra at note 141, art. 35.
146.
147.
Id. arts. 35, 55.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
148.
Protocol I, supra at note 141, art. 48.
149.
Id. art. 50(3). Also of interest is Article 58, which requires parties to
150.
separate their military operations from civilian populations as much as possible.
151.
Id. art. 51(4)(a).
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their design and execution, violate the principle of distinction, as even
a cluster bomb which is directly on target will scatter submunitions
over a broad footprint, potentially harming anyone in the vicinity. 152
International tribunals have not applied the distinction principle this
aggressively.i 5 3
Article 51 also contains language setting forth the related
principle of proportionality, which limits the range of acceptable
civilian casualties resulting from attacks on military targets. The
principle of proportionality bans indiscriminate attacks, including
those "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, [or] damage to civilian objects . .. which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated." 154 Article 57 requires choosing methods and means of
attack that will minimize civilian casualties, and repeats Article 51's
Under Protocol I, IHL
language on disproportionate attacks.' 55
recognizes that military objectives will sometimes be located in such
close proximity to civilians as to make collateral damage unavoidable,
but it establishes rules to minimize civilian casualties as much as
possible. As with the rule of distinction, cluster munition opponents
have argued that the weapons inherently violate the rule of
proportionality.156
B. Prosecutionsof IHL Violations Stemming from Cluster
Munition Use: The Former Yugoslavia,
Eritrea,and Beyond
Although cluster munitions are not explicitly banned under IHL,
international tribunals have successfully prosecuted cluster munition
users under traditional IHL by demonstrating that the manner in
which they used the weapons violated principles such as distinction
and proportionality.1 57 The underlying facts of these prosecutions
demonstrate the degree to which courts were willing to punish the
use of cluster munitions under basic IHL principles. One of the

152.
Cf. Wiebe, supra note 18, at 109, 112 (describing the large footprints and
likely collateral damage associated with cluster munition strikes).
153.
Cf. Partial Award-Central Front-Ethiopia's Claim 2 (Eri. v. Eth.), 43
113 (Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm'n 2004) (holding that use of
I.L.M. 1275, 1296,
cluster bombs in close proximity to civilian village violated IHL).
154.
Protocol I, supra note 141, art. 51(5)(b). Paragraph 5(a) also bans treating
separate military targets as one and attacking them together when they are among
civilians.
155.
Id. art. 57(2)(a).
156.
Cf. Wiebe, supra note 18, at 103 (noting that U.S. commanders use suspect
calculations of military advantage and civilian casualties in weighing the costs and
benefits of specific attacks).
157.
See generally Wiebe, supra note 70 (analyzing convictions for the use of
cluster munitions in the former Yugoslavia and Ethiopia).
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attacks that led to prosecution occurred in the former Yugoslavia in
1995,158 the other in Ethiopia in 1998.'5 In both situations, the
accused were found guilty because of the specific manner in which
they deployed the weapons.
In 1995, Croatian forces invaded the Republic of Serbian Krajina
(RSK), a short-lived rebel state. 160 In response to this invasion, RSK
fired rockets carrying cluster munitions on Zagreb, the capital of
Croatia. 16'
Milan Marti6, President of RSK, was convicted of war
crimes for these attacks. 162 The defense argued that the attacks were
aimed at Croatian governmental buildings, such as the presidential
palace and Ministry of Defense.16 3 However, the rockets came down
in areas filled with civilians, killing and wounding about two
hundred.164 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia heard testimony on the nature of the rockets used in the
attack, including their range, accuracy, payload of submunitions, and
footprint.' 6 5 Based on this evidence, the court determined that the
use of the rockets on urban targets necessarily constituted an attack
on the civilian population, and thus found Marti6 guilty.166 Although
the court did not go so far as to find the use of cluster munitions in all
situations to be a war crime, it did send the message that directing
them against targets in civilian population centers is illegal under the
principles of IHL.
In the 1998 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, both employed
After the hostilities ended, the Eritreacluster munitions.16 7
Ethiopia Claims Commission charged Eritrea with war crimes for the
cluster bombing of civilian targets in the town of Mekele.168 The
disputed attack began when four Eritrean aircraft bombed Mekele.1 69
Although the military target of the attacks was the airport, cluster
bombs came down on residential neighborhoods and a school,
resulting in over two hundred civilian casualties.170 The court found
Eritrea liable for the casualties and damage to civilian property, but

158.
See generally Prosecutor v. Martid, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007).
159.
See generally Partial Award-Central Front-Ethiopia's Claim 2 (Eri. v.
Eth.), 43 I.L.M. 1275 (Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm'n 2004).
160.
Martid, Case No. IT-95-11-T, 302.
161.
Id. T 305, 309.
162.
Id. 480.
163.
Id. 461.
164.
Id. 1 308, 313.
165.
Id. 462.
166.
Id. 469.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53.
167.
Partial Award-Central Front-Ethiopia's Claim 2 (Eri. v. Eth.), 43 I.L.M.
168.
1275, 1291, 101 (Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm'n 2004).
169.
Id. 1 103.
170.
Id.
101, 103.
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did not base its decision on Eritrea's choice of ordnance.1 71 Instead,
the court ruled that Eritrea did not take the necessary precautions
under Article 57 of Protocol I in attacking the airport.'7 2 Thus, this
decision did even less than the Marti6 conviction to move IHL in the
direction of banning cluster munitions outright.
In addition to their convictions stemming from the use of cluster
munitions, Eritrea and RSK have something else in common: both
were small countries with little or no political clout on the global
level. In these cases, the trials were before courts convened for the
specific purpose of investigating war crimes stemming from the
particular conflicts. Larger and more powerful states have managed
to avoid prosecution, let alone conviction, for war crimes. The United
States is not a party to the Rome Statute, and thus not subject to the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC).' 73 Even when
there has been a specific judicial mechanism created to investigate
actions of major powers, they have avoided any potential
consequences. For example, after NATO's use of cluster munitions in
Kosovo in 1999, the prosecutor appointed to investigate potential war
crimes during that conflict declined to pursue action against the
NATO states and aircrews. 174 No war crimes prosecutions are
forthcoming regarding Israel's launching of thousands of rockets
carrying cluster bombs into southern Lebanon at the end of its war
with Hezbollah in 2006.175 In both of these cases, far more cluster
munitions were deployed than in either of the cases where
prosecution actually occurred, and the Israeli actions in particular
were arguably illegal under principles of customary IHL.17 6 At least
one commentator has written on the difficulty of pursuing war crimes
prosecutions against major powers and in "important" wars.1 77 As a
result, any measure to limit the use of cluster munitions must be
voluntary to a certain degree-states must either agree to a ban, or
they must agree to be subject to war crimes prosecutions, whether
generally, such as submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICC, or in the
aftermath of a specific conflict. Neither solution seems likely. 78

171.
Id. T 113.
172.
Id. TT 110, 112.
173.
Glazier, supra note 143, at 1342.
174.
McDonnell, supranote 22, at 116.
175.
Borneman, supra note 93, at 276.
176.
Ching, supra note 11, at 159.
177.
See Borneman, supra note 93, at 280-81 (describing the political roadblocks
to prosecuting world powers).
178.
See infra Part IV.D.
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C. The CCW: An Alternate Treaty Approach to Cluster Munitions
Although their general inaccuracy and wide footprints make
cluster munitions dangerous to civilians when first launched, their
high dud rate17 9 is perhaps their most alarming flaw. Prior to the
creation of the CCM, the CCW adopted a protocol dealing with the
issue of explosive remnants of war.18 0 The goal of the CCW was to
minimize the dangers posed by ERW.1 8
The CCW specifically
excludes mines from its definition of explosive ordnance, 182 and does
not mention cluster munitions. The general principles of the CCW,
however, can be applied to unexploded bomblets. Moreover, some of
the states not party to the CCM are parties to the CCW. For those
states, the CCW provides the only guidelines for dealing with
unexploded bomblets. The United States is one such state.18 3
Like analogous provisions in the Land Mine Treaty and CCM,
Article 3 of the CCW requires state parties to clear, remove, and
destroy ERW in areas under their control and to assist other states in
their efforts to do the same. 184 The CCW requires state parties to
keep close track of their use of explosive ordnance in order to
facilitate ERW cleanup after conflicts end18 5 and to assist and
cooperate with the efforts of other nations.'8 6 Similar to the Land
Mine Treaty and CCM, parties to the CCW are required to protect
civilians from dangerous areas through fencing, signs, and other
precautions.' 8 7 Although the CCW has many provisions mirroring
those in the CCM, it also requires state parties to take steps to
prevent the creation of ERW.188 The Technical Annex to the CCW
Among these
provides guidance on how to minimize ERW.189
measures are quality control in production, testing, careful transport
and storage, and proper training for those who will use the
9 storage and transport are likely
ordnance.19 0 As discussed supra,'1

See discussion supra Part III.A.
179.
CCW, supra note 76.
180.
Id. pmbl., para. 2. ERW includes both UXO and abandoned explosive
181.
ordinance (AXO). Id. art. 2(4). Cluster munition duds fall into the category of UXO, but
since the CCW takes the broader approach, ERW will be used in place of UXO in
explaining its provisions.
182.
Id. art. 2(1).
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 60. Other notable states include China,
183.
India, Israel, South Korea, Pakistan, and Russia. Id.
CCW, supra note 76, art. 3(1).
184.
185.
Id. art. 4.
186.
Id. art. 8.
187.
Id. art. 5.
188.
Id. art. 9.
189.
Id. art. 9, annex 3.
190.
Id.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
191.
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the reasons cluster munitions have a higher failure rate in the field
than they do in manufacturers' tests. Although the Annex does not
specifically mention weapon design or function, Article 9 clearly
states that the Annex is not an exhaustive list of ways to minimize
ERW. 9 2 Thus, design improvements that would lower dud rates
significantly would further the goals of the treaty, as fewer duds
mean fewer ERW.
Although the CCW does not address cluster munitions
specifically, its provisions are applicable to one of the two main issues
that cluster munitions present. As it deals only with explosive
remnants of war, the CCW does not solve the problem of wide
footprints or inaccuracy leading to civilian casualties immediately
upon the use of cluster munitions. In terms of negative aftereffects,
however, the CCW does much of the same work the CCM does,
requiring its state parties to make efforts to reduce their creation of
ERW, protect civilians from existing ERW, and clear ERW from
former battlefields to make them inhabitable once again. Although it
does not address the short-term effects of cluster munitions, the CCW
does address many of the long-term effects. Thus, it will continue to
be important to the regulation of cluster bomb use as long as some
user states abstain from the CCM.

D. The Status of IHL and Enforcement After the CCM
Although states not party to a treaty cannot violate its terms,
over time, the existence of a treaty can expand customary IHL to
include the requirements of the treaty. 9 3 As discussed supra,194 the
provisions of Protocol I have become customarily accepted over the
past three decades.s9 5 Critics of cluster munitions have argued for
their illegality based on the principles of proportionality and
distinction, which are rooted in Protocol I.196 Although the United
States never ratified Protocol I, American proponents of cluster
munitions have not argued that the principles of Protocol I do not
apply to U.S. forces, but rather that cluster munitions do not violate
those principles.1 97 This stance suggests that they do not dispute
that the Protocol I principles have become customary IHL. The CCM
bans specific ordnance, while Protocol I requires a case-by-case
analysis of whether an attack violates the principles of distinction
and proportionality. Therefore, if its provisions become sufficiently

192.
193.
provisions
194.
195.
196.
197.

CCW, supra note 76, art. 9.
See Ching, supra note 11, at 134 (noting that a treaty that contains "core
of customary international law" can apply to states that have not ratified it).
See supra Part W.A.
McDonnell, supra note 22, at 103-08.
Id.
E.g., Lacey, supra note 9, at 29-30.
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accepted to constitute customary IHL, user states will have no basis
to argue that cluster munitions remain acceptable under IHL.
Although the long-term impact of the CCM on IHL remains unknown,
the large number of signatories, including several NATO states,
suggests that the Convention's provisions are likely to be accepted as
customary IHL in the future.
Even assuming that the use of cluster munitions becomes
recognized as a violation of customary IHL, several major obstacles
block an effective enforcement scheme. Prosecutions for violations of
international criminal law have generally taken place under the
jurisdiction of specialized courts convened for the purpose of
addressing IHL violations in specific conflicts.19 8 Even when such
courts have investigated the actions of major powers, these
investigations do not usually result in prosecutions. 9 9 Although
specialized courts have been the norm for IHL prosecutions, the
recent establishment of the ICC has created another avenue for
prosecution. 200 Under the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction
over violations of various international crimeS 201 and over cases
dealing with cluster munitions, should customary IHL treat such
ordnance as illegal.20 2
While the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC is plausibly
broad enough to encompass prosecution for the use of cluster
munitions, its personal jurisdiction over user states is significantly
more limited. Under the terms of the Rome Statute, the ICC's
jurisdiction is restricted to states party to the statute, both for
conduct perpetrated by their nationals and for conduct occurring
within their territory. 203 One hundred thirty-nine states signed the
statute, and 110 states ratified it. 204 Although over half the world's
states comprise the parties to the statute, many notable states
remain absent, including China, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan,
Russia, and the United States.20 5 The status of these states is

For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
198.
Yugoslavia.
Wiebe, supra note 18, at 134 (discussing prosecutor's decision not to pursue
199.
charges against NATO forces after investigating their use of cluster munitions in the
former Yugoslavia).
See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, entered
200.
into force July 1, 2000, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (establishing the International Criminal
Court).
Id. art. 5(1).
201.
202.
Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xx).
203.
Id. art. 12. States not party to the Rome Statute may voluntarily submit to
the ICC's jurisdiction in individual cases. Id.
204.
Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, UN TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mtdsg-no
=XVIII-10&chapter--18&lang-en (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
Id. Israel, Russia, and the United States have signed the Rome Statute, but
205.
have not ratified it to become parties. Id.
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significant in addressing the cluster munition problem, as they are
among the states that use and produce cluster munitions and are
non-parties to the CCM. 206 The same key states that have chosen not
to agree on an outright ban on the use of cluster munitions have also
resisted jurisdiction for specific instances of misuse. This weakens
the ability of international courts to adjudicate specific investigations
and charges of powerful states that continue to use cluster
munitions. 207

V.

THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO CLUSTER MUNITIONS AND THE CCM

A. U.S. Policy on the Legality of Cluster Munitions
As recently as June 2008 (with the CCM treaty process well
underway), the U.S. Department of Defense articulated its position
that cluster munitions are "legitimate weapons with clear military
utility."208 The American stance holds that cluster munitions provide
particular advantages in attacking specific types of targets, and can
reduce collateral damage in certain cases. 20 9 The Department of
Defense Policy Memo outlining the American position does not focus
on the specific principles of IHL potentially implicated by cluster
munition use. Rather, the memo expounds the utility of the ordnance
in attacking certain targets.21 0
American military lawyers have addressed the specifics of
cluster munition use and IHL, arguing that cluster munitions play a
vital role in the nation's arsenal and that the Convention presents an
obstacle to the successful prosecution of the war on terror. 2 11 They
focus on rebutting the proportionality and distinction arguments of
critics. First, when discussing the proportionality of an attack, any
potential harm to civilians is weighed against military gain.2 12 The
proportionality principle takes into account that some harm to
civilians is inevitable, which is why the principle is not an absolute
ban on any action that results in harm to civilians. Specific use of the
weapons must be tailored to the particular military needs, and some
uses may violate proportionality. 2 13 All weapons in the modern
arsenal present the danger of collateral damage to civilians, and

206.
207.
208.

See supra Part V.
See supra text accompanying note 177.
Defense Policy Memo, supranote 14, at 1.

209.
210.

Id.
Id.

Lacey, supra note 9, at 33.
211.
Herthel, supra note 47, at 258.
212.
213.
See generally Partial Award-Central Front-Ethiopia's Claim 2 (Eri. v.
Eth.), 43 I.L.M. 1275 (Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm'n 2004).
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treating cluster munitions as violating proportionality per se, rather
than requiring a balancing of costs and benefits, is at odds with the
theory of proportionality analysis. 214 Therefore, by taking certain
precautions to minimize the dangers unique to cluster munitions,
military commanders can make effective use of the ordnance while
complying with IHL. 215 Conversely, failing to take such precautions
would lead to IHL violations if an attack caused excessive collateral
damage. 216
Second, proponents of cluster munitions dispute the claim that
the weapons violate the IHL principle of distinction. They argue that
cluster munitions may be aimed at certain targets, such as tank
formations and aircraft on runways, without risking harm to
civilians. 21 7 While recognizing that the weapons do create wide
footprints, they argue that this characteristic of the ordnance does
not make cluster munitions indiscriminate as a matter of law.
Proponents argue instead that the principle of distinction is focused
on weapons like long-range unguided missiles and the use of poison
in water supplies.2 18
The crux of the argument that cluster munitions are
indiscriminate, however, is not their wide footprints, which are
accounted for in a proportionality analysis. Rather, the high dud
rates fuel much of the criticism. Supporters of cluster munitions have
The general
less convincing counterarguments on this point.
approach is to treat bomblet duds as equivalent to other UXO. 21 9
However, even those who argue for the legality of cluster munitions
concede that the UXO left by submunition duds is more dangerous
than other types. 220
The advent of the CCM creates problems for the arguments
rationalizing cluster munition use because those arguments are

Lacey, supra note 9, at 29 (stating that if weapons were required never to
214.
cause collateral damage "there would be no need for commanders and Soldiers to
engage in the delicate and difficult balancing test that is the proportionality principle").
See Ching, supra note 11, at 154 (concluding that the United States' use of
215.
cluster munitions in Afghanistan and Iraq was legal under IHL because the United
States took proper precautions, including "embedding military lawyers with troops
using cluster bombs, warning Afghan civilians not to mistake dud bomblets for
humanitarian food rations, and replacing its older model cluster bomblets with newer
versions that contained self-destructing fuses to prevent dud munitions").
216.
Cf. Partial Award-Central Front-Ethiopia's Claim 2 (Eri. v. Eth.), 43
I.L.M. 1275 (Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm'n 2004).
217.
Herthel, supra note 47, at 264.
218.
See id. at 264-65 (stating that the delegates to the drafting of Protocol I
were concerned with long range strikes by unguided missiles, and noting that the
commentary to Protocol I identified poisoning wells as an indiscriminate method).
219.
Id. at 265-66; see also Lacey, supra note 9, at 30 (discussing efforts to
resolve cluster munition dud issues under the CCW).
220.
Lacey, supra note 9, at 30 ("The problem is further exacerbated by the fact
that many of the submunitions are colored in orange or yellow hues.. .. mak[ing] such
bomblets the proverbial 'attractive nuisance' to small children.").
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justified, at least in part, on the lack of international agreement to
ban the weapons. One commentator, writing several years before the
drafting of the Convention, considered the lack of an international
consensus on the illegality of cluster munitions in analyzing the
proportionality issue. 221 Because it is nearly impossible to measure
suffering objectively, a "consensus among nations," such as exists
regarding poison gas, is the only way for a weapon to violate the
proportionality principle per se. 222 This argument has two major
weaknesses. First, it reduces the proportionality principle to a mere
tautology-if weaponry in the abstract cannot violate proportionality
principles (absent a consensus), and suffering cannot be measured to
be weighed against the utility of a particular action, no evaluation
standard exists to measure the proportionality of a weapon, or even of
a specific instance of its use. Second, the existence of the CCM
changes the analysis by moving closer to a consensus among nations.
Although the Convention does not represent an absolute consensus,
as many nations have not signed or ratified it, it is a clear sign that
the international community is not ambivalent about cluster
munitions. 223
Moreover, the existence of the CCM further
undermines the argument that cluster munitions are not
indiscriminate because proponents can no longer argue based on the
decisions of past international conferences not to regulate them.224
B. The American "Solution"to the Cluster Munition Problem:
Building a Better Bomb
Although the U.S. Department of Defense and military
commentators maintain that the cluster munitions currently in the
American arsenal are legal, the Pentagon has adopted a policy
intended to reduce the harm the weapons cause to civilians. 225 The
policy calls for the cluster munitions in the American stockpile to
have a dud rate of no higher than 1 percent by 2018.226 The use of
cluster munitions with dud rates over 1 percent requires specific
authorization from the Combatant Commander.2 2 7 Any transfer of
cluster munitions with higher dud rates to other nations is
conditioned on an agreement that the state receiving the cluster

221.
Herthel, supra note 47, at 258.
222.
Id.
Cf. id. at 265 (noting the trend toward an understanding of landmines as
223.
inherently indiscriminate).
Contra id. (noting that regarding "cluster munitions, delegates to the
224.
Lucerne and Lugano Conferences addressed and rejected the very issue of a treaty to
regulate cluster munitions").
225.
Defense Policy Memo, supra note 14, at 2.
226.
Id.
227.
Id.
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munitions not use such ordnance after 2018.228 These policy changes
would require the disposal of cluster munitions in the current
stockpile,22 9 and an improvement on existing technology, as even
conservative estimates put current submunition dud rates at 5
percent.2 3 0
At least one commentator has argued that improvements in
cluster munition technology could bring U.S. cluster bombs within
the exceptions to the CCM and allow the United States to ratify the
Convention while still utilizing the weapons.23 1 However, such an
argument misreads the Convention's language on exceptions. The
exception in question requires the munitions to meet five different
criteria. 232 Technological improvements could meet three of these
criteria, but the Convention's other two requirements limit weapons
to ten or fewer submunitions, each weighing four or more
kilograms.2 33 Such a weapon would be fundamentally different from
a traditional cluster bomb and may not serve the purposes for which
the American military insists cluster munitions are essential.
The new defense policy on cluster munitions is a partial solution
to the problems associated with the ordnance, and opponents of a ban
point to the policy as the proper way to address the dangers
associated with cluster munitions. 234 The policy does not, however,
cure all ills. There will still be some UXO from cluster munition
attacks with the same dangers, even if fewer total UXO exist due to
lower dud rates. However, combined with close adherence to the
CCW, to which the United States is a party, this policy could alleviate
some of the issues stemming from submunition UXO. Nonetheless,
the policy only addresses the issue of duds, which is only one of the
problems with cluster munitions. 235 Although precision guidance
systems are becoming more commonplace, 236 many cluster munitions
are not equipped with them,2 37 and the new defense policy does not

228.
Id.
Id.
229.
Wiebe, supra note 18, at 118.
230.
Joseph Anzalone, The Virtue of a ProportionalResponse: The United States
231.
Stance Against the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 22 PACE INT'L L. REV. 183, 209-10
(2010) (arguing that the use of advanced guidance systems, sensor fuses, selfdestruction and self-activation systems, and a low failure rate would bring cluster
munitions within the exceptions to the Convention).
CCM, supra note 1, art. 2(2)(c).
232.
233.
Id.
Cf. Lacey, supra note 9, at 30 (discussing the new policy in response to
234.
criticism of cluster munitions for violating distinction principles).
See supra Part III.A.
235.
See Herthel, supra note 47, at 263 (stating U.S. policy to employ precision
236.
guided ordnance even when not mandated by IHL).
See Lacey, supra note 9, at 28 (stating that 90 percent of the cluster
237.
munitions in the American arsenal are part of the Army's artillery stockpile).
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include a requirement for improved precision. 238 Therefore, the
policy does nothing to address the problems associated with cluster
munitions during deployment, and trying to improve, rather than
remove, cluster munitions is seen as an incomplete solution to those
problems.2 39

VI. SOLUTIONS GOING FORWARD
As long as the world's major powers have cluster munitions in
their arsenals, the serious harm they cause to civilian populations is
likely to continue. After the First World War, the international
community was quick to ban poison gas, which both sides had used.
The specter of mutually assured destruction has prevented the use of
nuclear weapons since World War II. Unlike these weapons, cluster
munitions are not only stockpiled in droves, but they are actually
Their
used on today's battlefields with some frequency. 240
devastating power has inspired arguments for their illegality and
resulted in a treaty to ban them. However, their use is likely to
continue, because the major user states are not parties to the treaty.
A. The Inadequacy of Existing Treaties
Currently, the legality of the use of cluster munitions is affected
by several treaties. The CCM bans them outright. 241 The principles
of IHL found in Protocol I prohibit their use in certain
circumstances, 242 and arguably constitute an outright ban
independent of the CCM. 24 3 The Rome Statute governs how and
against whom prosecutions for IHL violations can occur. 244 The
CCW, without giving cluster munitions special treatment, governs
how states should handle dud munitions generally. 245 All of these
treaties, however, suffer from the same inherent limitation: their
limited reach. Unlike domestic laws, which apply to all people within
a state, treaty law only applies to those states that agree to it. The
exceptions to this principle are rare, and usually involve a victorious
state prosecuting the leaders of its defeated enemy, 246 or UN
involvement in the resolution of disputes between small nations. 247

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See Defense Policy Memo, supra note 14, at 2 (outlining the policy).
Wiebe, supra note 70, at 960-63.
See, e.g., Ching, supra note 11, at 139-40.
CCM, supra note 1, art. 1.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra note 102.
See supra Part IV.D.
See supra Part IV.C.
For example, the Nuremburg trials of Nazi leaders.
For example, the special tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
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Although the principles of customary IHL apply to non-state
actors, 248 no effective prosecution can exist if those actors remain at
large.
In the case of cluster munitions, this reality is particularly
problematic. The major users of cluster munitions are parties to
neither the CCM nor the Rome Statute. 249 Thus it is extremely
difficult to hold them accountable for cluster munitions violations of
IHL because the ICC lacks jurisdiction over non-partieS250 and
prosecution in ad hoc tribunals seems remote.25 1 The situation is
further exacerbated by the political stances of the states involved.
Many of the military powers currently stockpiling cluster munitions
are world superpowerS 252 or regional rivals. 2 53 States involved in
contentious border disputes or global power politics may be reluctant
to take voluntary steps that they perceive as hamstringing their
military capability. 254
Article 21 of the CCM creates another unusual dynamic in the
problem of the enforceability of the cluster munitions ban. Allowing
state parties to conduct joint operations with non-parties could
potentially have two effects. Although it could encourage the user
state to forgo or drastically reduce its use of cluster munitions, the
opposite result seems more likely. The NATO countries will continue
to operate alongside American forces, 255 despite the Convention's ban
on most activities collateral to the use of cluster munitions. 25 6
Convincing the major Western powers to join the Convention without
such a provision would have given the CCM much more force, but was
unrealistic given the importance of the NATO alliance. 25 7 This
provision weakens the ability of the CCM to increase the stigma

248.
Ching, supranote 11, at 134.
249.
See supraPart IV.D.
250.
See supra Part IV.D.
251.
See Borneman, supra note 93, at 280 (noting the difficulty of prosecuting
"major geopolitical perpetrators on the world stage").
252.
For example, the United States, Russia, and China.
253.
For example, India and Pakistan, North and South Korea.
254.
See, e.g., Anzalone, supra note 231, at 209.
There is abundant proof that the United States' military strategy depends on
the ability to use cluster munitions during military operations. Considering the
position of the United States in the world . . . weakening the United States'
military capability is tantamount to weakening the military might of the
Western world.
Id.
255.
See CCM, supra note 1, art. 21 (allowing state parties to conduct joint
military operations with non-state parties).
256.
Id. art. 1(1)(b).
257.
See Lacey, supra note 9, at 32-33 (explaining that during the Oslo
negotiations, interoperability with coalition forces was a "major concern" for the United
States and other proponents of the treaty).
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associated with cluster munitions and pressure states to join the
Convention or to stop using the weapons of their own accord.
B. The Inadequacy of the American Approach and How to Improve It
If the treaty approach to solving cluster munition problems is
deficient in its lack of reach, the internal American approach is
equally deficient in its lack of scope. The United States has not
joined the CCM or the Rome Statute,2 5 8 so it is neither forbidden
from using cluster munitions nor subject to any war crimes
prosecutions that could potentially arise from their misuse. The
United States is, however, a party to the CCW,259 and American
cluster munition apologists argue that submunition duds should be
treated like other UXO. 260 Likewise, the current Department of
Defense policy on cluster munitions is focused on reducing dud
rates. 261 Thus the American policy only addresses half of the
problem, leaving the dangers associated with the wide footprints of
the weapons unaddressed. Proponents of cluster munitions argue
that the proportionality principle allows for the use of cluster
munitions when the risks to civilians have been properly weighed
against the military utility in a particular attack. 262 However, they
have generally not discussed exactly what process to use and criteria
to weigh to determine when the use is justified. 263 American
policymakers have made some effort to address the aftereffects of
cluster munition use, but have done little to reduce the problems
occurring contemporaneously with the attacks themselves. Assuming
the United States is not going to join the Rome Statute or the CCM,
its efforts must ensure the safety of those who live near warzones and
establish more clearly the line between legal and illegal use of the
ordnance.
The first step the United States should take is to ensure that it is
a model citizen in its compliance with the CCW. Even if the United
States insists on treating submunition duds as legally indistinct from
other UXO, 264 it must recognize that these duds are pragmatically
more troublesome than other UXO. The United States did not join
the Land Mine Treaty, but has made significant efforts assisting in
the removal of mines worldwide. 265 Cluster munition UXO, unlike

See supra Part IV.D.
258.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 60.
259.
Herthel, supra note 47, at 265-66.
260.
Defense Policy Memo, supra note 14, at 2.
261.
Herthel, supra note 47, at 267.
262.
But cf. Ching, supra note 11, at 154 (listing embedded lawyers, warnings to
263.
civilians about duds, and use of self-destructive bomblets as precautions that likely
rendered cluster munition use in Afghanistan legal).
264.
See, e.g., Herthel, supranote 47, at 265-66.
265.
Glazier, supra note 143, at 1340.
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landmines, is part of the CCW's general scheme, 266 and thus the
American obligation to take the forefront in its removal is even
The large role the United States has had in the
greater.
development, production, and use of cluster munitions, and its
continuing insistence on using the weapons, creates a moral
obligation to put itself at the vanguard of those working to reduce the
post-conflict maladies the weapons cause. Not only would such an
approach lessen the potential legal and ethical problems resulting
from past use of cluster munitions, but it would signal to other
nations that continue to use the weapons that doing so brings with it
a responsibility to minimize the risks to civilians, even years after
combat.
The Pentagon should also reevaluate its policy on cluster
munition use. Currently, the policy only addresses the aftereffects by
requiring a low number of duds seven years from now. 26 7 This policy
seems insufficient, given the number of years before the 1 percent
requirement becomes effective. Improving the dud rates without
introducing strict policies regulating the use of the more reliable
ordnance is inadequate. Even the most reliable cluster munitions can
be used irresponsibly. 268 In addition to its mandate on dud rates, the
Pentagon should adopt a stricter policy on the use of cluster
munitions, designed to reduce their negative effects at the time of
impact, not simply in the period after their deployment. Proponents
of the legality of cluster munitions argue that balancing military
objectives against civilian losses and determining that the former
may outweigh the latter justifies cluster munition use. 269 The United
States should adopt stricter requirements to ensure that such
balancing actually occurs, and that the decision to use cluster
munitions is undeniably justified in the principles of IHL. To the
extent that it does not jeopardize the efficacy of operations or the
safety of U.S. military personnel, the policy should be public, as a
further example of proper use.
The United State should adopt bright-line rules, such as a ban
on the use of cluster munitions in urban areas regardless of the
presence of any military objectives. 270 Although a delicate and
difficult balancing of interests is involved in battlefield decisions,

266.
See Nout van Woudenberg, The Long and Winding Road Towards an
Instrument on Cluster Munitions, 12 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 447, 470-71 (2007)
(discussing the creation of the CCW and its broad definition of UXO, excluding
landmines).
267.
Defense Policy Memo, supra note 14, at 2 (by 2018).
268.
See Eitan Barak, None to Be Trusted: Israel's Use of Cluster Munitions in
the Second Lebanon War and the Case for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 25 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 423, 451 (2010) (suggesting "that once armies are equipped with
presumably dud-free CMs, restraints over CM use . . . are considerably weakened").
Herthel, supra note 47, at 267.
269.
For a similar argument, see Anzalone, supra note 231, at 210.
270.
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bright-line rules would prove useful in correcting some of the
inherent biases that factor into such decisions. Commanders are
expected to err on the side of the safety of their troops over that of
civilians who may be located near enemy positions. Without a set of
bright-line rules, commanders may be inclined to justify any use of
cluster munitions by arguing that it was the only way to protect their
troops, even without concrete proof one way or the other. Adopting
bright-line rules would create a rebuttable presumption that the
ordnance is not to be used, and require proof that it is necessary
before it may be implemented.
Additionally, the United State should limit the use of cluster
munitions to targets for which they clearly offer advantages over
1
other ordnance, such as troop and vehicle formations in the open.27
Even in such cases, the military should use cluster munitions as a
last resort. The advent of "smart bombs" guided to their targets by
sophisticated systems obviates the need for cluster munitions in some
of the circumstances in which they were first employed. 272 The
Pentagon should also adopt a policy tliat mandates that cluster
munitions be equipped with these precision guidance systems, much
as it has put a limitation on the percentage of submunitions that may
be duds. 273 Although cluster munitions were developed in part to
274
compensate for the inherent inaccuracy of unguided projectiles,
27 5
some are currently equipped with precision guidance systems.
Requiring the use of guidance systems is especially important,
because the large footprints of submunition cluster patterns
exacerbate the problem of missing the target, potentially doubling the
distance by which an errant bomb misses.27 6 The use of these
systems would eliminate this problem without reducing the military's
capability to engage targets in the most efficient and effective manner
possible. Adopting these increased restrictions on cluster munition
use would bolster the credibility of American claims that cluster
munitions are lawful when used properly, giving more force to the
argument that precautions are actually taken, and focus increased
scrutiny on more reckless use of the weapons.
If the United States adopts stricter policies on the use of cluster
munitions, this move would have a twofold effect on the incidence of
the problems they cause. The first effect would be a reduction in
civilian casualties stemming from American cluster bomb attacks.

Herthel, supranote 47, at 264.
271.
See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
272.
Defense Policy Memo, supra note 14, at 2.
273.
274.
See supra Part II.A.
Wiebe, supra note 18, at 127-28. A precision guidance requirement could
275.
probably be implemented earlier than the low dud requirement, because it would not
require development of new technology.
See supra text accompanying note 46.
276.
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This consequence is significant, for the United States is among the
major users of cluster munitions worldwide, 277 and is currently
involved in multiple wars. The second effect stems in part from the
first. Because the United States is such a major user of cluster
munitions, its use of the weapons is likely to impact the global
impression of their legality. By taking extreme precautions, the
United States can show other users of cluster munitions that,
although it considers the weapons to be legal, it is loath to use them
unless such use indisputably complies with the norms of IHL. By
sending this message, the United States can influence the behavior of
other user states, making less calculated and discriminate uses of
cluster munitions appear even more blatantly illegal. The policy
should not stop at strict regulation of cluster munition use-the
United States should adopt a policy prohibiting transfer of cluster
munitions to states that have shown a willingness to use the
ordnance in a manner that clearly violates IHL principles. Assuming
that the United States is unwilling to join the CCM, it must take
affirmative steps to ensure that its own use of the weapons, as well as
theirs, comports with the norms of IHL.

VII. CONCLUSION
The propensity of cluster munitions to create significant dangers
for civilians remains a significant problem with the ordnance. These
dangers exist not only at the moment the weapons are discharged,
2 78
but also years after combat has ceased due to high dud rates.
Although some have questioned the legality of cluster munitions in
all cases, courts that have addressed the problem chose to focus
instead on the specific facts surrounding their use, avoiding the issue
of whether the weapons are inherently illegal.2 79 Dissatisfied with
this approach, a large segment of the international community signed
the CCM, which bans the weapons. 280 However, the major user
states of cluster munitions have not joined the Convention, leaving
28 1
the legality of the weapons under IHL principles an open question.
Opponents of cluster munitions point to their inaccuracy and
high dud rates as reasons for their illegality under IHL. Meanwhile,
defenders of cluster munitions argue that these attributes are not
unique, but rather common to all weapons.2 82 Proponents of their use

Ching, supra note 11, at 139-40.
277.
See supra Part III.A.
278.
See supra Part IV.B.
279.
See generally CCM, supra note 1.
280.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 60.
281.
Compare Wiebe, supra note 18, at 112 ("The combination of questionable
282.
targeting ability, large footprints, and multipurpose use for submunitions makes
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argue that cluster munitions can satisfy the IHL proportionality test
if the proper precautions are taken in their use. 28 3
These
precautions, however, are not defined clearly enough to ensure that
future use of the weapons is legal. If the United States insists on
maintaining and using cluster munitions, it must establish brightline rules restricting their use.
The military should consider
compliance with these rules mandatory before any balancing of
interests is even considered. The United States has taken some steps
in alleviating the problems associated with dud submunitions, but
must go a step further and become a leader in the cleanup effort,
while taking steps to ensure American allies are not creating more
danger for civilians. Moreover, strict rules of engagement must be
promulgated to limit the collateral damage at the time of deployment.
Any argument that cluster munitions remain legal and serve a
legitimate military purpose is only as credible as the process by which
the military evaluates the need to use them, respecting the
consequences of possible misuse.
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